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Abstract
In this paper I examine whether a society can improve welfare by imposing a legal restric-
tion to forbid the use of nominal bonds as a means of payments for goods. To do so, I integrate
a microfounded model of money with the framework of limited participation. While the asset
market is Walrasian, the goods market is decentralized and the legal restriction is imposed
only in a fraction of the trades. I show that the legal restriction can improve the society’s
welfare. In contrast to the literature, this essential role of the legal restriction persists even
in the steady state and it does not rely on households’ ability to trade unmatured bonds for
money after observing the taste (or endowment) shocks.
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The co-existence of money and nominal bonds is a classical issue in monetary economics (e.g.
Hicks 1939). When nominal bonds are default-free, they have all the essential features that money
has. However, nominal bonds do not act as a medium of exchange to the same extent as money
does and that they are discounted. A typical resolution of this anomaly is to assume that there
are legal restrictions that reduce the liquidity of bonds by limiting the use of bonds as a medium
of exchange (e.g., Wallace, 1983). Traditional models of money have employed this assumption
implicitly, in the form of cash in advance or money in the utility function. However, the legal
restrictions in those models are not “essential” to the society; rather, they reduce agents’ utility.
An essential role of the legal restrictions has been elusive in the literature.
T h e r ea r et w or e a s o n sw h yi ti si m p o r t a n tt oﬁnd an essential role of the legal restrictions.
First, without such a role, it is diﬃcult to justify why the legal restrictions should be imposed or
to explain why the return dominance of money by bonds has survived so long. Second, there is
a large literature that uses traditional models to analyze monetary policy such as open market
operations (e.g., Lucas, 1990). Because the legal restrictions implicit in those models reduce
welfare, the eﬀects of policy are suboptimal outcomes. Eliminating the legal restrictions could
generate the eﬃcient allocation in those models, but then open market operations would not have
any eﬀect on the real activity. If we can justify the legal restrictions on the eﬃciency ground,
then we can ensure that the real eﬀects of open market operations are optimal responses of the
economy to monetary policy.
In this paper, I construct a model to show that the legal restrictions can improve welfare in
the steady state. The model is a hybrid of the deterministic version of Lucas’s (1990) model
of limited participation and the search model of money in Shi (1997). The bonds market is
centralized (Walrasian), but the goods market is decentralized with random matching. The
goods market induces a demand for a medium of exchange. A legal restriction forbids the use of
bonds as a means of payments in the trades of one group of goods labelled “red” goods. Such
a trade is called a restricted trade, in which the buyer can use only money to buy goods. In
the trades of another group of goods labelled “green” goods, the buyer can use both money and
bonds to buy goods. Such a trade is called an unrestricted trade. Whether the goods are red or
green is determined by a shock that is realized after agents are matched. For the same level of
consumption, the relative utility of consuming red goods to consuming green goods is θ.
1When θ is either small or large, the legal restriction does not aﬀect the real allocation. When
θ has intermediate values, the legal restriction reduces the quantity of (red) goods traded in
restricted matches and increases the quantity of (green) goods traded in unrestricted matches. If
θ is less than 1, these changes in the quantities shift consumption from the goods of low marginal
utility to the goods of high marginal utility, and hence reduce the gap between the marginal
utilities of consuming the two groups of goods. As a result, the legal restriction improves expected
utility in this case. The legal restriction also increases the nominal interest rate.
Kocherlakota (2001) seems the ﬁrst to show that a legal restriction that prevents bonds from
being used as a means of payments for goods can improve welfare. Although there are some
similarities between my paper and his, there are also substantial diﬀerences. First, the results
diﬀer. In Kocherlakota’s model, the welfare-improving role of the legal restriction lasts for only
one period, because the households diﬀer in tastes in only one period. Making the diﬀerence in
tastes permanent does not make the essential role of the legal restriction persist; to the contrary,
it will eliminate the essential role. Introducing idiosyncratic shocks to tastes every period may
enable the essential role to persist, but it will also make the model intractable by introducing non-
degenerate distributions of asset holdings. My model provides a tractable framework in which
the legal restriction improves welfare even in the steady state.
Second, the mechanisms diﬀer in the two models. In Kocherlakota’s model, the legal restriction
improves welfare by smoothing the marginal utility of consumption between households who have
received diﬀerent taste shocks. For the essential role to occur, it is critical that the taste shocks
are realized before the households go to the goods market, so that the households with high tastes
are able to trade bonds for money with the households with low tastes. In contrast, the legal
restriction improves welfare in my model by smoothing the marginal utility of goods obtained in
diﬀerent matches for the same household. This essential role of illiquid bonds remains the same
regardless of whether households can trade assets before going to the goods market. In fact, I
will assume that the taste shocks are realized after agents have gone to the market, so that all
households go to the goods market with the same portfolio of assets.1
The ﬁrst paper that examines the competition between money and nominal bonds in a search
1There are two recent papers that generate an essential role for illiquid bonds, Boel and Camera (2005) and
Sun (2005). In Boel and Camera, the households diﬀer in the rate of time preference as well as the marginal utility
of consumption. In Sun, the tastes of the households alternate between odd and event periods. As Kocherlakota’s
model, these two models build the essential role of the legal restrictions on the assumption that the households can
trade bonds and money after the taste shocks are realized but before going to the goods market.
2model of money is Aiyagari et al. (1996). They assume that money and bonds are indivisible and
that agents cannot always redeem matured bonds even when they want to. These assumptions
restrict the ability of bonds to compete against money and make the results diﬃcult to interpret.
In a precursor to this paper (Shi, 2005), I eliminate these assumptions and show that even an
arbitrarily small legal restriction can prevent matured bonds from circulating as a medium of
exchange. However, the legal restriction does not improve welfare there.
2. A Search Economy with the Legal Restriction
2.1. Households, Matches and Assets
Consider a discrete-time economy with many types of households. The number of households in
each type is large and normalized to one. All households have the same discount factor β ∈ (0,1).
The households of each type are specialized in producing a good which they do not consume
and which they exchange for a consumption good in the market. Goods are perishable between
periods. Each good has two colors, “green” and “red”, which are indexed by i ∈ {G,R}.T h e
utility of consuming a non-consumption good is zero. The utility of consuming a consumption
good of color i is θiu(ci), where θG =1a n dθR = θ (> 0). Assume that u0 > 0, u00 < 0, u0(0) = ∞
and u0(∞)=0 . 2 The cost (disutility) of production is ψ(.), which has the following properties:
ψ(0) = 0, ψ0(0) = 0, ψ0(q) > 0a n dψ00(q) ≤ 0f o ra l lq>0.
There are two assets in the economy, ﬁat money and nominal bonds issued by the government.
These objects can be stored without cost. Both are intrinsically worthless; i.e., they do not yield
direct utility or facilitate production. Bonds ared e f a u l t - f r e ea n ds or i s k sa r en o tt h er e a s o nf o r
bonds to be discounted in this model. As described later, the separation between the bonds
market and the goods market makes it impossible for households to take newly issued bonds
to the goods market in the same period. To allow bonds to perform the role of a medium of
exchange before the maturity, the length of the maturity must be two periods or longer. The
simplest bonds that can perform this role are two-period, pure discount bonds. These bonds will
be the object analyzed in this paper. The bonds one period after the issuing date are called
unmatured bonds. At the maturity, each bond can be redeemed for one unit of money.
Also, I assume that the government does not redeem bonds that have passed the maturity.
This assumption is innocuous in the described economy because it is optimal for a household to
2All the analytical results hold for a more general speciﬁcation u(c
i,θ
i), where the derivative of u with respect
to c has the additional feature that it increases in θ.
3redeem all matured bonds immediately at maturity rather than keeping them for the future as a
medium of exchange (see Shi, 2005).
The government sells bonds in a centralized competitive market. As in Lucas (1990), house-
holds cannot bring goods into the asset market, and so the asset market involves only the exchange
between diﬀerent assets. Let zM be the amount of new bonds sold in the bonds market, where
z ∈ (0,∞) is a constant and M is the aggregate stock of money. Denote the market price of newly
issued (two-period) bonds as S. The two-period (net) nominal interest rate is r =1 /S −1. Also,
households can bring unmatured bonds into the asset market to exchange for money or newly
issued bonds. Let Su be the nominal price of unmatured bonds in the bonds market. Then,
(1/Su − 1) is the one-period interest rate implied by bonds of the old vintage.
The exchange in the goods market is decentralized and described by random bilateral matches.
There is no chance of a double coincidence of wants in a meeting to support barter or public record-
keeping of transactions to support credit trades. As a result, every trade entails a medium of
exchange, which can be money or unmatured bonds or both. Call an agent in the goods market
a buyer if he holds money or bonds, and a seller if he holds no asset. A seller produces and sells
goods, and a buyer purchases consumption goods. Let σ be the (ﬁxed) fraction of sellers and
(1 − σ) the fraction of buyers in the market. Of interest are the meetings of a single coincidence
of wants, i.e., meetings in which one and only one agent can produce the partner’s consumption
goods. Call such a meeting a trade match. A buyer encounters a trade match in a period with
probability ασ and a seller with probability α(1 − σ), where α > 0 is a constant.
Random matching can generate non-degenerate distributions of money holdings and con-
sumption. To maintain tractability, I assume that each household consists of a large number of
members (normalized to one) who share consumption each period and regard the household’s util-
ity function as the common objective. This assumption makes the distribution of money holdings
across households degenerate so that I can select an arbitrary household as the representative
household.3 In each household, there are a measure σ of sellers and (1 − σ) of buyers. A buyer
brings a combination of money and unmatured bonds into a trade.
There are two possible types of trade matches, red and green. With probability p all members
of the household (buyers and sellers) will be in red matches and with probability 1 − p they will
be all in green matches. As described earlier, the goods in the two types of matches yield diﬀerent
3The assumption of large households is a modelling device extended from Lucas (1990), which is meant to capture
an individual agent’s allocation of time over diﬀerent activities. See Faig (2004) for an alternative interpretation.
4levels of marginal utility. The matching shocks are independent across households and over time.
Although a household experiences both red and green trades over time, it experiences only one
of the two types in any given period. This modelling method simpliﬁes the analysis by reducing
the number of diﬀerent types of matches that a household will face in a period.4
A legal restriction forbids the use of bonds as a means of payments for goods. For the legal
restriction to have a real eﬀect, it cannot be enforced on all trades — A universal restriction would
amount to rescaling the stock of assets used in the goods market and hence would not aﬀect real
activities. Thus, I assume that the legal restriction is enforced only in the trades of red goods.
At r a d eo fr e dg o o d si st h e nc a l l e dar e s t r i c t e dtrade and a trade of green goods is called an
unrestricted trade.
Moreover, I assume that the matching shocks are realized after the households have already
chosen the portfolio and gone to the markets (see the later description of the timing). In particular,
the household’s decisions in the asset market cannot depend on the matching shocks in the
current period. This is a deliberate assumption for two reasons. First, it simpliﬁes the analysis
by eliminating the possibility of non-degenerate distributions of asset holdings across households.
Second, the assumption ensures that the welfare-improving role of the legal restriction will remain
even if the trading of unmatured bonds for money is shut down.
2.2. Choices and the Timing of Events
To describe the timing of events, pick an arbitrary period t, suppress the time index t, and shorten
the subscript t ± j as ±j. Also, pick an arbitrary household as the representative household.
Lower-case letters denote the decisions of this household and capital-case letters other households’
decisions or aggregate variables. I depict the timing of events in a period in Figure 1.
At the beginning of the period the household redeems bonds that were issued two periods ago
and receives lump-sum monetary transfers, T. After these events, the household’s holdings of
money are denoted m and of unmatured bonds b. Monetary transfers keep money holdings per
household growing at a constant (gross) rate γ.
The household divides the assets into two parts. A fraction a of money and a fraction l
of unmatured bonds are allocated to the goods market, where l indicates “liquid” bonds, while
the remaining assets are allocated to the bonds market. The household divides the assets for
4This modeling method is not critical for the analytical results. See section 5 for the alternative modelling where
each household experiences both types of trades in a period.
5the goods market evenly among the buyers. Each buyer carries am/(1 − σ) units of money and
lb/(1 − σ) units of unmatured bonds into the goods market.
At the time of choosing the portfolio divisions (a,l), the household also chooses the quantities
of trades in the two markets. In the goods market, I assume that the buyers make take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀe r s .S u c ha no ﬀer consists of the amount of goods to be purchased, qi, and the amount
of assets to be spent, xi, conditional on the type of trade i ∈ {G,R}. The quantities of trade in
the bonds market are the amount of new bonds to be bought, d, and the amount of unmatured
bonds with which the household will exit the bonds market, bu. These quantities in the bonds
market cannot depend on the matching shock in the goods market because the household cannot























Figure 1 Timing of events in a period
Next, the two markets open simultaneously and separately. In particular, the matching shocks
in the goods market are realized and an amount zM of new bonds are sold in the bonds market,
where z>0. The members trade according to the quantities chosen by the household. After the
trade, the household pools the receipts from the trades and allocates consumption evenly among
the members. After consumption, time proceeds to the next period.
As in Lucas (1990), the temporary separation between the two markets implies a discount on
new bonds because by bringing money to buy the new bonds, the household has to forego the
opportunity of using the money to buy goods. In contrast to Lucas’s model, the goods market is
decentralized here, rather than centralized. Also, Lucas assumes that money is the only medium
of exchange. In contrast, households in the current model can use unmatured bonds, as well as
money, to buy goods in some trades.
2.3. Quantities of Trade in the Goods Market
Normalize all nominal variables by the aggregate stock of money holdings per household. Let m
be the household’s holdings of money and b the holdings of unmatured bonds at the beginning of
a period after the household has redeemed matured bonds and received monetary transfers. Let
6v(m,b):R+ × R+ → R be the household’s value function. Suppose that the household receives
the matching shock i ∈ {G,R} in the current period. Let mi
+1 and b+1 be the household’s holdings
of money and unmatured bonds next period. (The amount of unmatured bonds next period does
not depend on i because it is determined by the trading decisions in the bonds market which are
made before the matching shock is realized.) Let ωji be the shadow value of next period’s asset













,i ∈ {G,R}, (2.1)
where the subscripts of v indicate partial derivatives. Other households’ values of the two assets
are denoted similarly with the capital-case Ω.
In each trade of type i, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, (qi,x i). The oﬀer must
satisfy two types of constraints. One is the asset constraint, i.e., that the amount of assets oﬀered
cannot exceed the amount that the buyer can use. Because of the legal restriction, this constraint
is diﬀerent for a restricted trade and an unrestricted trade. I write the constraint for the two









In an unrestricted trade, it is unnecessary to specify how the assets oﬀered by the buyer are
divided between money and unmatured bonds. The two assets have the same continuation value:
Upon exiting from the trade, the only thing the household can do with the assets is to bring them
to the next period, at which time the bonds will mature and can be redeemed for money at par.5
More precisely, after the trade is completed, the two assets have the same marginal value ωmi to
the buyer and Ωmi to the seller, conditional on the current matching shock i.
Another constraint on the oﬀer is that the oﬀer must give the seller a non-negative surplus in
order to induce the seller to participate in the trade. The seller’s surplus is equal to the value of
the assets received in the trade, Ωmxi, minus the cost of production, ψ(qi) .B e c a u s ei ti so p t i m a l
for the buyer to squeeze the seller’s surplus to zero, I can write the constraint as:
xi = ψ(qi)/Ωmi, i = G,R. (2.4)
5For the same reason, a trade in the goods market between a money holder and a bond holder is inconsequential,
and so it is omitted here.
7Note that the seller’s valuation of the asset is indexed by the same index i as the realization of
the buyer’s matching shock. This is because all members of the seller’s household are assumed to
experience the same type of trades in a period. If one particular seller is in a type i trade, then
all other trades that his household experiences in the period are also of type i.
2.4. A Household’s Decision Problem
The household’s choices in each period are the portfolio divisions, (a,l), the quantities of trade,
(qi,x i), the amount of new bonds to purchase, d, the amount of unmatured bonds to hold exiting
the bonds market, bu, consumption, ci, and future asset holdings, (mi
+1,b +1). Taking other
households’ choices and aggregate variables as given, the choices solve the following problem:
(PH) v(m,b)=m a x
h




Wi = θiu(ci) − ασ(1 − σ)ψ(Qi)+βv(mi
+1,b +1)
ci = ασ(1 − σ)qi,i ∈ {R,G}
and the constraints are as follows:
(i) the constraints in the goods market, (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4);
(ii) the constraints in the bonds market: bu ≥ 0a n d
Sd ≤ (1 − a)m + Su [(1 − l)b − bu]; (2.6)














+( lb + bu)
o
+ T+1;( 2 . 8 )
(iv) other constraints: 0 ≤ a ≤ 1a n d0≤ l ≤ 1.
Consumption is equal to the amount of goods obtained by the buyers in the period, where
the total number of such trades is ασ(1−σ). The disutility of production is computed similarly,
with Q replacing q. The constraints in (i) and (iv) are self-explanatory.
The constraint bu ≥ 0 in (ii) requires that the household should not sell more unmatured
bonds than the amount it brought into the bonds market.6 The constraint (2.6) states that
6This constraint arises because the government does not buy back unmatured bonds. Individual households can
issue private bonds. However, because all households are symmetric and because the shocks are iid over time, such
private bonds do not aﬀect the equilibrium.
8money spent on newly issued bonds comes from money that the household brings into the bonds
market plus the receipt from selling unmatured bonds.
The law of motion of unmatured bonds, (2.7), is straightforward — newly issued bonds in this
period become unmatured bonds next period. The factor 1/γ appears on the right-hand sides of
(2.7) because nominal variables in each period are normalized by the money stock per household
in that period. To explain the law of motion of money, (2.8), recall that the household’s money
holdings are measured at the time immediately after receiving monetary transfers and redeeming
matured bonds (see Figure 1). These holdings can change between two adjacent periods as a
result of the following transactions: purchasing newly issued bonds, selling unmatured bonds in
the bonds market, selling and buying goods, redeeming matured bonds and receiving monetary
transfers next period, T+1. The terms following m on the right-hand side of (2.8) list the net
changes in money holdings from these ﬁve types of transactions.
Remark 1. In a symmetric equilibrium, all households make the same choices. In particular,
xi = Xi for i = R,G. Then, (2.8) shows mR
+1 = mG
+1.T h a ti s ,t h ea m o u n to fm o n e yh o l d i n g sa t
the end of a period is independent of the matching shocks that the household receives. Because
the holdings of unmatured bonds at the end of a period is also independent of the matching
shocks, all households hold the same portfolio of assets at the end of a period. Thus, the use of a
representative household can be maintained over time and I can suppress the superscripts (R,G)
on (m,ωm,ωb,Ωm,Ωb).
2.5. Deﬁnition of a Symmetric Equilibrium and Restrictions
A symmetric equilibrium consists of a sequence of a representative household’s choices, (a,l,q,x,d,





households’ choices (capital-case variables) such that the following requirements are met. (i)
Optimality: given other households’ choices, the household’s choices solve (PH) with given initial
holdings (m0,b 0) and the value function satisﬁes (2.5); (ii) symmetry: the choices (and shadow
prices) are the same across households; (iii) clearing of the market of newly issued bonds: d = z,
with 0 <z<∞; (iv) clearing of unmatured bonds in the bonds market: bu =( 1− L)B;( v )
positive and ﬁnite values of assets: 0 < ωm
−1m<∞ and 0 < ωb
−1b<∞ if m,b > 0; (vi)
stationarity: all real variables and the values (ωm
−1m,ωb
−1b) are constant.
Note that symmetry implies m = M = 1 and that the requirement (iii) requires the choice of
9d to be interior. Stationarity implies ωm
−1 = ωm and ωb
−1 = ωb.
Money is said to generate liquidity services in the goods market if either the asset constraint
(2.2) or (2.3) binds. In contrast, unmatured bonds yield liquidity services only if (2.3) binds.
Unmatured bonds are said to be perfect substitutes for money if they have the same value as
money, i.e., if ωb = ωm. As I will show later, if unmatured bonds are perfect substitutes for
money, then they must generate liquidity services. But the reverse is not necessarily true.
I have restricted the amount of newly issued bonds to be a constant fraction of the money
stock. The total value of each asset is restricted to be positive and ﬁnite, in order to examine
the coexistence of money and bonds.7 Furthermore, I restrict attention to the equilibria in which
money serves as a medium of exchange. This restriction imposes two requirements. First, the
money growth rate must satisfy γ > β.I f γ = β, then money would not generate liquidity
services; if γ < β, then a monetary equilibrium would not exist. Second, a>0; otherwise money
would not be used in the goods market. Note that a<1 from the market clearing condition for
newly issued bonds. Hence, 0 <a<1.
3. The Stationary Equilibrium
3.1. Optimal Choices
To characterize the equilibrium, let me ﬁrst analyze the representative household’s optimal de-
cisions. Let ρ be the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint in the bonds market, (2.6). Let
λR be the shadow price of the asset constraint om a trade of red goods, (2.2). To simplify the
formulas, multiply λG by the expected number of such trades, ασ(1 − σ)p, before incorporating
the constraint into the maximization problem. Similarly, let λG be the shadow price of (2.3)
and multiply it by ασ(1 − σ)(1 − p). The household’s optimal decisions are characterized by the
following conditions.
(i) For qi:
θiu0(ci)=( ωm + λi)
ψ0(qi)




pλR +( 1− p)λG
i
= ρ, (3.2)
ωb =( ωm + ρ)S. (3.3)
7The value of each asset must be bounded in order to ensure that the household’s optimal decisions are indeed
characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions.
10(iii) For (l,bu):
ωm + ασ(1 − p)λG =( ωm + ρ)Su if l ∈ (0,1), (3.4)
ωm =( ωm + ρ)Su if bu > 0. (3.5)
In each of these conditions, the choice variable attains the lowest value in the speciﬁed domain if
the condition is replaced by “<”, and the highest value if “>”.








−1 =( 1− l)(ωm + ρ)Su + l
h
ωm + ασ(1 − p)λG
i
. (3.7)
The condition (3.1) requires that a buyer’s net gain from asking for an additional amount of
goods be zero. By getting an additional unit of good in a type i trade, the household’s utility
increases by θiu0(ci). The cost is to pay the additional amount ψ0(qi)/Ωm of assets in order to
induce the seller to trade (see (2.4)). By giving one additional unit of asset, the buyer foregoes
the discounted future value of the asset, ωm, and causes the asset constraint in the trade to be
more binding. Thus, (ωm + λi) is the shadow cost of each additional unit of asset to the buyer’s
household and the right-hand side of (3.1) is the cost of getting an additional unit of good.
To interpret the conditions in (ii), recall that optimal choices of a and d are both interior.
For the optimal allocation of money to be interior, (3.2) requires that money should generate the
same amount of liquidity services in the two markets by relaxing the asset constraints. For the
optimal amount of the purchase of the new bonds to be interior, (3.3) requires that the expected
future value of these bonds be equal to the cost of money that is used to acquire them, including
the shadow cost of the money constraint in the bonds market (ρ).
The choices l and bu are not necessarily interior. For the allocation of unmatured bonds, (3.4)
compares the shadow values of unmatured bonds in the two markets. The shadow value of an
unmatured bond in the goods market is [ωm + ασ(1 − p)λG], because the bond may generate
liquidity services in unrestricted trades and can be carried over to the next period. The shadow
value of an unmatured bond in the bonds market is (ωm+ρ)Su, because the bond can be sold for
Su units of money and each unit of money has a shadow value (ωm + ρ) in the bonds market. If
the optimal choice of l is interior, then these two shadow values must be equal to each other. For
the re-balancing of unmatured bonds, (3.5) compares the shadow value of keeping such bonds for
11redemption next period and the shadow value of selling it now for money in the bonds market.
The household chooses to carry a positive amount of unmatured bonds out of the bonds market
only if these two shadow values are equal to each other.
Finally, the envelope conditions require the current value of each asset to be equal to the
sum of the future value of the asset and the expected liquidity services generated by the asset
in the current markets. Take money for example. The current value of money is given by the
left-hand side of (3.6), where ωm
−1 is multiplied by γ/β because ωm
−1 is deﬁned as the value of
money discounted to one period earlier. The right-hand side of (3.6) consists of the (discounted)
future value of money, ωm, and weighted sum of liquidity services generated by money in the two
markets. The weights are a for liquidity services in the goods market and (1 − a) for liquidity
services in the bonds market. By (3.2), this weighted sum of liquidity services is equal to ρ.
3.2. Existence of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium must have ρ > 0; otherwise, money would not generate liquidity services and a
stationary equilibrium would exist only if γ = β. By (3.2), money must generate liquidity services
in at least one of the two types of trades in the goods market. That is, the asset constraint binds
either in restricted trades (λR > 0) or in unrestricted trades (λG > 0) or in both. To describe












= k, for k>0. (3.9)
Note that f is well deﬁned for all k ∈ (0,∞) and that it is a decreasing function. Also, µ>0
because γ > β. The three cases of the equilibrium are as follows.
Case PS (Perfect Substitutability): λR =0a n dλG > 0. The features are:
(i) Unmatured bonds are perfect substitutes for money: ωb = ωm;
(ii) A household takes all unmatured bonds to the goods market: l =1 ;
(iii) The price of newly issued two-period bonds is S = β/γ;
(iv) The price of unmatured bonds is indeterminate: β/γ ≤ Su ≤ 1;
(v) The quantities of goods traded in matches are qG = qG
1 and qR = qR















12(vi) The allocation of money is a =1− zβ/γ.
Case IS (Imperfect Substitutability): λR > 0a n dλG > 0. The features are:
(i) Unmatured bonds are imperfect substitutes for money: ωb < ωm;
(ii) A household takes all unmatured bonds to the goods market: l =1 ;
(iii) The price of newly issued bonds is unique and lies in ((β/γ)2,β/γ);
(iv) The price of unmatured bonds is indeterminate;
(v) The quantities of goods traded in matches are qG = qG
2 (a)a n dqR = qR
2 (a), where
qG






























(vi) The allocation of money lies in (1 − zβ/γ, 1 − z(β/γ)2) and is uniquely given by












Case BS (Bad Substitutability): λR > 0a n dλG = 0. The features are:
(i) Unmatured bonds are imperfect substitutes for money: ωb < ωm;
(ii) A household takes only a fraction of unmatured bonds to the goods market:
0 ≤ l<1;
(iii) The price of newly issued two-period bonds is S =( β/γ)2;
(iv) The price of unmatured bonds is unique: Su = β/γ;
(v) The quantities of goods traded in matches are qG = qG
3 and qR = qR
3 ,w h e r e
qG











(vi) The allocation of money is a =1− z(β/γ)2.


































Note that 0 < Θ1 < 1. Also, Θ3(l) > Θ1 and Θ0
3(l) < 0 for all l ∈ [0,1]. I prove the following
proposition in Appendix A:
Proposition 3.1. Assume that 0 <z<γ/β. An equilibrium exists and is characterized by one
of the three cases listed above. Case PS occurs for θ ≤ Θ1. Case BS occurs for θ ≥ Θ3(1).C a s e
IS occurs for Θ1 < θ < Θ3(1). The equilibrium is unique for θ ≤ Θ3(1).W h e nθ > Θ3(1),t h e r e
is a continuum of equilibria (Case BS) that diﬀer in the value of l but have the same values of
(qG,qR,S,a).
When the tastes for red goods are very low, the economy is in Case PS. In this case, the legal
restriction in the goods market does not bind, because the marginal utility of red goods is so
low that the buyer does not spend all the money in a restricted trade. As a result, unmatured
bonds are perfect substitutes for money in the goods market. A household takes all unmatured
bonds to the goods market. Newly issued two-period bonds are still discounted, but the discount
arises entirely from the one-period separation between the bonds market and the goods market.
The discount is a compensation for the foregone liquidity services that could be generated if the
amount of money is brought to the goods market instead.
When the tastes for red goods are very strong, the equilibrium is Case BS. This case is
opposite to Case PS. In Case BS, the asset constraint binds in a restricted trade (for red goods)
but not in an unrestricted trade (for green goods). Unmatured bonds do not yield liquidity
services and so they are poor substitutes for money. A positive discount on unmatured bonds is
necessary for the equilibrium, which induces a deeper discount on newly issued two-period bonds
than in Case PS. Thus, the bond price is lower than in Case PS. Moreover, because unmatured
bonds do not generate liquidity services, a household is indiﬀerent at the margin about sending
more unmatured bonds into either of the two markets. There are a range of values of l that are
consistent with equilibrium.
Case IS is between Cases PS and BS, and it occurs when θ has intermediate values. In this
case, the asset constraints bind in both types of trades and a household takes all unmatured bonds
14to the goods market, but unmatured bonds are not perfect substitutes for money. Unmatured
bonds are discounted, but not as deeply as in Case BS. Similarly, the discount on newly-issued
two-period bonds is smaller than in Case BS but greater than in Case PS.
In Case BS, the price of unmatured bonds is Su = β/γ. In contrast, Su is indeterminate in
both Cases PS and IS: Because the amount of unmatured bonds carried to the bonds market is a
corner solution 0, the Walrasian price of these bonds is not unique. However, this indeterminacy
has no consequence on real activities. Moreover, because unmatured bonds generate liquidity
services in Cases PS and IS but newly issued bonds do not, the price of unmatured bonds exceeds
the price of newly issued one-period bonds, the latter of which is β/γ.
Because of the above diﬀerence in the price of unmatured bonds in the three cases, the term
structure of interest rates also diﬀers in these cases. In Case BS, the yield curve is ﬂat, since the
price of two-period bonds is equal to the square of the price of one-period bonds. In Cases PS
and IS, the yield curve is negatively sloped. The slope is steeper in Case PS than in Case IS,
because unmatured bonds yield higher liquidity services in Case PS.
4. Welfare-Improving Role of the Legal Restriction
In this section, I show that the legal restriction can improve welfare. Welfare is measured as the
following steady state utility per period:
(1 − β)v =( 1 − p)
h




θu(ασ(1 − σ)qR) − ασ(1 − σ)ψ(qR)
i
.
To begin, note that unmatured bonds are perfect substitutes for money in an economy without
the legal restriction. In such an economy, the price of newly issued bonds is S = β/γ and
a =1− zβ/γ. Then, the real allocation without the legal restriction is equivalent to the one in
an economy without nominal bonds (up to rescaling the money stock), i.e., the economy with
z =0 . T a k i n gt h el i m i tz → 0 in Cases PS, IS and BS, I obtain the real allocation without the
legal restriction as follows:






.I nt h i sc a s eqG = qG








< θ < 1+
µ






Case C: θ ≥ 1+
µ
p.I nt h i sc a s e ,qG = qG
3 and qR = qR
3 .
15Note that the real allocation is the same in Case A as in Case PS, and the same in Case C as
in Case BS. Thus, the legal restriction does not aﬀect the real allocation when the tastes for the
two types of goods are far from being symmetric. However, the allocation in Case IS is diﬀerent
from that in Case B. So, the restriction aﬀects the allocation when θ has intermediate values.
It is meaningful to use the parameter z to measure the extent of the legal restriction, because z
is the amount of unmatured bonds that are prevented by the restriction from acting as a medium
of exchange.8 I will examine small legal restrictions ﬁrst and then large legal restrictions. The
proofs of the propositions in this section appear in Appendix B.
4.1. Small Legal Restrictions
A slightly positive z represents a small legal restriction. The legal restriction changes both the
region of existence of Case IS and the quantities of goods traded in matches in that case. On
the region of existence, a small legal restriction reduces both the lower bound, Θ1, and the upper
bound, Θ3(1), of the region in which Case IS occurs. The eﬀects on the quantities of goods traded
a n do nw e l f a r ea r es u m m a r i z e da sf o l l o w s :
Proposition 4.1. In comparison with an economy without the legal restriction, a small legal
restriction reduces a, increases the quantity of (green) goods traded in an unrestricted match,
and reduces the quantity of (red) goods traded in a restricted match. The legal restriction






< θ < 1.
The legal restriction can improve welfare when red goods generate a lower marginal utility
than green goods and when this asymmetry in the tastes is not very large. The legal restriction
has this essential role because it shifts the purchasing power of the assets from restricted trades
to unrestricted trades. If the (green) goods in unrestricted trades yield a higher marginal utility
than the (red) goods in restricted goods, then this shift reduces the gap in the marginal utility
of consumption of the two types of goods, and hence increases expected utility.
To see how the legal restriction shifts the purchasing power between the two types of goods,
let me examine how the restriction aﬀects the amount of assets allocated to the goods market.
This amount is am+lb, which is equal to a+z/γ in Case IS of the equilibrium. An increase in z
8In contrast, the parameter p is not a suitable one with which one conducts comparative statics on the legal
restriction. A change in p changes not only the coverage of the legal restriction, but also preferences. Even without
the legal restriction, a change in p aﬀects the quantities of goods traded in matches.
16has two opposite eﬀects on this amount. One eﬀect is to reduce a, i.e., to shift money from the
goods market to the bonds market. The other eﬀect is to increase b.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tw h e n
z is near 0, the eﬀect through b dominates and so the total amount of assets in the goods market
increases with z. In an unrestricted trade, this larger amount of assets allows a buyer to buy a
larger quantity of goods. The eﬀect is opposite in a restricted trade. There, because a buyer can
only use money to buy goods and because the legal restriction reduces the amount of money in
the goods market, the buyer in a restricted trade can only aﬀord a smaller quantity of goods.
Thus, there is a shift of the purchasing power from restricted trades to unrestricted trades.
Note that prices do adjust to the increased amount of assets in the goods market. Express
prices of goods in terms of utility, i.e., by multiplying prices by the marginal value of money
ωm. Then, the price of the (green) goods in an unrestricted trade increases to respond to the
increased amount of assets in the trade, and the price of the (red) goods in restricted trades falls
to respond to the reduced amount of money in the trade. However, these responses of prices do
not fully oﬀset the shift of the purchasing power between the two types of matches.
Also note that the welfare-improving role of the legal restriction necessarily comes with a
higher interest rate. In the case where the legal restriction can improve welfare (i.e., Case IS),
the bond price is between (β/γ)2 and β/γ. In the absence of the legal restriction, the bond price
is β/γ. Thus, the legal restriction reduces the bond price and hence increases the interest rate.
The welfare-improving mechanism has some interesting diﬀerences from that in Kocherlakota
(2003). In Kocherlakota, the legal restriction has a diﬀerent form — it applies to all trades
rather than a fraction of the trades. (If such a universal legal restriction were imposed in the
current model, it would not aﬀect the real allocation.) To generate an essential role for the
restriction, Kocherlakota assumes that households receive the taste shocks ﬁrst and trade assets
before going to the goods market. As a result, diﬀerent households with diﬀerent tastes choose
diﬀerent portfolios of assets before they go to purchase goods. Such trading in the asset market
prior to the goods market is critical there for the legal restriction to reduce (or smooth) the gap
between diﬀerent households’ marginal utilities of consumption. In contrast, the households in
my model receive matching shocks after they have already chosen the portfolio of assets, and so
all households hold the same portfolio entering the markets. In addition, all trades in the goods
market occur between households who receive the same matching shock. A household smoothens
the marginal utility of consumption not by trading with other households that have diﬀerent taste
17shocks, but by smoothing the marginal utility between the two types of matches.
To see the above diﬀerence between the two models in another way, suppose that the house-
holds are not allowed to trade unmatured bonds. In the current model, because net trading
of unmatured bonds in the bonds market is zero anyway, shutting down such trading does not
aﬀect the allocation or the welfare-improving role of the legal restriction. In contrast, shutting
down the trading between unmatured bonds and money in Kocherlakota’s model eliminates the
welfare-improving role of the legal restriction.9
Above all, the most important diﬀerence between the two models is that the welfare-improving
role of the legal restriction lasts for only one period in Kocherlakota’s model, but the role sustains
in the steady state in the current model.
4.2. Large Legal Restrictions
In o wa l l o wz to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. The following proposition extends the essential
role of the legal restriction from small values of z to large values:
Proposition 4.2. For any given 0 <z<γ/β, there exists θA > Θ1 such that the legal restriction
improves welfare for θ ∈ (Θ1,θA).
This proposition does not indicate how wide the region is in which the restriction improves
welfare or how this essential role of the restriction depends on the parameter p.T o i l l u s t r a t e
these aspects of the equilibrium, consider the following example:
Example 4.3. Let u(c)=l n ( c) and ψ(q)=q.C h o o s e β =0 .995, γ =1 .005, α =0 .5,a n d
σ =0 .5.L e tz =0 .2. The length of a period is chosen to be one and a half month. The values of
β and γ are chosen to match the real interest rate and the inﬂation rate in a period. The value
of z reﬂects a signiﬁcantly large legal restriction.
The parameters θ and p are not given particular values. Instead, I will let θ vary between 0.6
and 1.2, and p between 0 and 1. The solutions to the variables will be expressed as functions of
these two parameters. I measure the welfare cost of the legal restriction in the standard way as
9This diﬀerence between the two mechanisms may be important for the following reason. If trading in the asset
market prior to the goods market is the way to achieve the smoothing of marginal utility of consumption, then
there may be other ways that can achieve better allocations than the legal restriction. Examples include discount
windows operated by the government and lending and borrowing between households.
18the percentage of consumption that a household is willing to give up in order to eliminate the
restriction. Denote this cost as ∆c(θ,p).
∆ C
theta: 0.6--1.2;    p: 0--1







∆C(θ,p): θ =0 .6+0 .015i, p =0 .017j;
The axes on the plane: i = 0 — 40, j =0—6 0 .
Figure 2a Welfare cost (% of consumption) of the legal restriction
Figure 2a depicts the welfare cost of the legal restriction as a function of θ and p.I n t h e
two ﬂat sections in the diagram, the legal restriction does not aﬀect the real allocation. The ﬂat
section with low values of (θ,p) corresponds to Case PS and the ﬂat section with high values
of (θ,p) corresponds to Case BS. The “hill” in the diagram is the region of (θ,p)i nw h i c ht h e
legal restriction reduces welfare. The “valley” is the region with negative welfare costs, in which
the legal restriction improves welfare. Similar to the case of small legal restrictions, the essential
role of large legal restrictions occurs when the relative tastes for the (red) goods in restricted
trades have intermediate values. As before (but not shown here), the legal restriction increases
the quantity of (green) goods traded in an unrestricted match and reduces the quantity of (red)
goods traded in a restricted match. Thus, the restriction improves welfare by reducing the gap
19between the marginal utility of consumption of the two types of goods.
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Figure 2b Welfare costs (% of consumption) with three values of θ
To see the welfare cost of the legal restriction in a diﬀerent way, I depict three sections of
Figure 2a in Figure 2b. These sections correspond to θ =1 ,0 .8, and 0.9 respectively. There
are a few noteworthy aspects of Figure 2b. First, for all three values, the welfare cost is zero
at the two ends, p =0a n dp =1 . W h e np = 0, the legal restriction is inactive. When p =1 ,
the legal restriction is imposed on all trades, which changes only the price level without any real
consequence. Second, when θ = 1, the legal restriction always reduces welfare, provided p 6=0
or 1. The explanation is that, when θ = 1, the economy without the restriction has already
equalized the marginal utility of consumption of the two types of goods. Since the restriction
shifts consumption from the restricted goods to the unrestricted goods, it widens the gap between
the marginal utility of consumption of the two goods, and hence reduces welfare. Third, when
θ =0 .8, the legal restriction always improves welfare. This is because the restriction shifts
consumption from the goods which the household values less to the goods which the household
values more. Finally, when θ =0 .9, the restriction reduces welfare when p is low and improves
welfare when p is high.
20In the above example, the size of the welfare gain or cost of the legal restriction is small,
around 0.5% of consumption. However, the gain can increase substantially with z.F o re x a m p l e ,
when z = 1, the gain from the legal restriction at θ =0 .2a n dp =0 .98 is 4% of consumption.
5. Discussions
5.1. Robustness of the Results
The welfare-improving role that the legal restriction has in this model relies on two features of
the model. First, trading in the goods market is decentralized and the legal restriction is imposed
in only a fraction of the trades. Second, at the time of choosing the amount of assets to be
brought into the goods market, an agent does not know which type of trades he will be involved.
Given these features, the essential role of the legal restriction can survive several modiﬁcations
of the model. I have already discussed one modiﬁcation which shuts down the trading between
unmatured bonds and money in the asset market — This modiﬁcation leaves the results intact.
Another modiﬁcation is to change the way in which a household experiences the matching
shocks. In previous sections, I have assumed that a household encounters either the trades of red
goods or the trades of green goods but not both in a period. An alternative speciﬁcation of the
matching shocks is as follows: After a match is formed, a shock is realized to determine whether
the seller in the match can produce red goods or green goods, where the probability with which
the seller can produce red goods is p. As before, the shocks are independent across the sellers
and over time. With this speciﬁcation, a household experiences both types of trades in a period.
Among the household’s buyers who trade, a fraction p of them purchase red goods and the other
fraction (1 − p) purchase green goods.
If each subgroup of the buyers who experience the same shock share consumption among
themselves but not with others, then expected utility of consumption in a period is:
pθu(ασ(1 − σ)qR)+( 1− p)u(ασ(1 − σ)qG).
The equilibrium in this economy is identical to the one analyzed in previous sections, and so the
essential role of the legal restriction remains. If, instead, all consumption goods are shared among
all members in the household, as in previous sections, then consumption of red goods per member
is cR = pασ(1 − σ)qR and consumption of green goods per member is cG =( 1− p)ασ(1 − σ)qG.
Expected utility of consumption in the household in a period is θu(cR)+u(cG). Wherever u0
21appears in section 3, change its argument to the new expressions for ci. Then, the characterization
of the equilibrium there is still valid. Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 can be modiﬁed to show that the
legal restriction continues to improve welfare for some values of (θ,p).10
5.2. Restrictions on Lump-Sum Taxes
The welfare-improving role of the legal restriction exists only when µ>0, i.e., when γ > β.
It vanishes in the limit γ ↓ β, because Case IS no longer exists in this limit. The limit γ ↓ β
corresponds to the so-called Friedman rule, because the nominal interest rate on a newly-issued
one-period bond is (γ/β −1). The legal restriction does not improve welfare in this limit because
the asset constraints in the goods market do not bind, in which case whether bonds can be used
to purchase goods or not is irrelevant for the quantities of goods traded in matches.
Although a stationary equilibrium requires γ > β,t h el i m i tc a s eγ ↓ β still deserves attention.
The issue at stake is whether the legal restriction can improve welfare when the money growth
rate is set optimally. In the economy without the legal restriction, it is easy to see that expected
utility (or welfare) decreases in µ and hence in γ. Thus, welfare is maximized at γ = β.I n
the economy with the legal restriction, expected utility decreases in γ in Cases PS and BS, but
changes ambiguously with γ in Case IS. However, when γ is suﬃciently close to β, expected utility
decreases in γ. Thus, it is possible that welfare in such an economy is also maximized at γ = β.
If this is the case, then setting money growth at the optimal rate in the two economies would
eliminate the welfare-improving role of the legal restriction.
One way to exclude the Friedman rule is to restrict the government’s ability to collect lump-
sum taxes, as in Kocherlakota (2003). Such a restriction is reasonable in the described economy
because agents are anonymous and trades are decentralized in the goods market. The law of
motion of money holdings implies that the amount of lump-sum transfers satisﬁes: γ2T = γ(γ −
1) − z(1 − γS). Because the bond price lies in the interval [(β/γ)
2 ,β/γ] in Case IS, a necessary
condition for T ≥ 0i sγ(γ − 1) − z(1 − β) ≥ 0. This condition can be written as γ ≥ γ0,w h e r e
γ0 > 1.
However, the above restriction on lump-sum taxes is much stronger than it is needed for
preserving the essential role of the legal restriction. As Proposition 4.2 states, there exists an
10After I wrote the ﬁrst version of the current paper in 2002, I became aware of a paper by Rocheteau (2002),
who uses a search model to examine the legal restrictions in the goods market. His model is diﬀerent from mine.
Also, his result on the welfare-improving role of the legal restriction is largely numerical.
22interval of θ in which the legal restriction improves welfare, provided that lump-sum taxes do not
induce γ = β or they are costly to collect.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I examine whether a society can improve welfare by imposing a legal restriction to
forbid the use of nominal bonds as a means of payments. To do so, I integrate a microfounded
model of money with the framework of limited participation. While the asset market is Walrasian,
the goods market is decentralized and the legal restriction is imposed only in a fraction of the
trades. I show that the legal restriction can improve welfare of the society. In contrast to some
previous results (see the introduction), this essential role of the legal restriction persists even in
the steady state and it does not rely on households’ ability to trade unmatured bonds for money
after observing the taste (or endowment) shocks. This robust role of the legal restriction can be
construed as a justiﬁcation for why bonds should be made less liquid than money.
The current model can be useful for analyzing monetary policy. In particular, the framework
of limited participation has been popular for analyzing the eﬀects of open market operations (see
Lucas, 1990). The current model provides a microfoundation of the role that the legal restrictions
play in the framework, and hence of the real eﬀects of open market operations there. Moreover,
the integrated model uncovers a new mechanism that propagates monetary policy. That is, open
market operations can aﬀect future activities by changing the amount of unmatured bonds that
will be used as payments for goods in a fraction of the trades in the future. To explore this new
mechanism fully, I need to make the model stochastic to capture the so-called liquidity eﬀect of
monetary shocks. This task is left for a sequel.11
11Williamson (2005) constructs a diﬀerent model of limited participation to prolong the real eﬀects of monetary
injection. However, he does not examine the essentiality of illiquid bonds.
23A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Consider Case PS ﬁrst. To show l = 1 in this case, suppose l<1 to the contrary. The market
clearing condition for unmatured bonds implies bu > 0. Because λG > 0 in this case, then (3.4)
would imply Su > ωm/(ωm + ρ) which would contradict (3.5). Thus, l =1 .T os h o wωb = ωm,
note that ρ = ασ(1−p)λG in the current case (see (3.2)). Because l = 1, then (3.6) and (3.7) yield
ωb = ωm =( ωm +ρ)β/γ, where I have used the stationarity of the equilibrium. Substituting this
result into (3.3), I get S = β/γ. Because the asset market constraint, (2.6), implies a =1− zS,
then a =1−zβ/γ. Under the assumption 0 <z<γ/β, a indeed lies in the interior of (0,1). The
feature l =1i m p l i e sSu ≤ 1 from (3.4) and the feature bu =0i m p l i e sSu ≥ β/γ.T os o l v ef o r
the quantities of goods traded in matches, solve λi from (3.1), substitute the result into (3.2) to
obtain ρ, and then substitute ρ into (3.6). This procedure yields qG = qG
1 and the feature λR =0
yields qR = qR
1 ,w h e r eqG
1 and qR
1 are deﬁn e di n( 3 . 1 0 ) .
Now I ﬁnd the restriction on θ that indeed delivers λG > 0a n dλR = 0. Because λG > 0a n d
λR = 0, the two asset constraints (2.2) and (2.3) induce the relationship: 1+ lb
am ≤ ψ(qG)/ψ(qR).
Substituting l =1 ,m =1 ,b = z/γ and a =1−zβ/γ, this condition becomes qR
1 ≤ Q1,w h e r eQ1
is deﬁned by (3.15). Substituting qR
1 , this condition is equivalent to θ ≤ Θ1,w h e r eΘ1 is deﬁned
in (3.16).
Next, consider Case BS. Again, use the market clearing condition for unmatured bonds,
bu =( 1− l)b.I f l<1, then bu > 0, and so (3.5) implies (ωm + ρ)Su = ωm.I f l =1 ,t h e n
(3.4) again implies (ωm + ρ)Su = ωm. Substituting this result and λG = 0 into (3.7) and using
the stationary requirement ωb
−1 = ωb,Ig e tωb = ωmβ/γ.C l e a r l y , ωb < ωm. Substituting ωb
and (3.6) and using stationarity, I can derive the bond price from (3.3) as S =( β/γ)2.T h e
constraint in the asset market then implies a =1− z (β/γ)
2 ∈ (0,1). The quantities of goods
traded in matches can be solved by following the same procedure as the above one for Case PS.
This procedure now yields qR = qR
3 and qG = qG
3 ,w h i c ha r ed e ﬁned in (3.14).
To ﬁnd where Case BS exists, divide the two assets constraints in the goods market to obtain
1+ lb
am ≥ ψ(qG)/ψ(qR), where the inequality comes from λR > 0a n dλG = 0. Substituting
m =1 ,b = z/γ and a =1−z(β/γ)2, the condition becomes qR
3 ≥ Q3(l), where Q3(l)w a sd e ﬁned
in (3.17). Substituting qR
3 , this condition is equivalent to θ ≥ Θ3(l), where Θ3(l)i sd e ﬁned in
(3.18).
Turn to Case IS. As in Case PS, λG > 0i m p l i e sl = 1. Because λG > 0a n dλR > 0, then
24(3.6) and (3.7) yield ωb < ωm. Also, (3.6) implies that ωm + ρ = ωmγ/β,w h e r eIh a v eu s e d
the stationary requirement ωm
−1 = ωm. Then, I can rewrite (3.3) as S =( β/γ)(ωb/ωm). Because





The feature λG > 0i m p l i e sS>(β/γ)2.B e c a u s ea =1− zS,t h e n1− zβ/γ <a<1 − z(β/γ)2.
Substituting the formula of S into the formula of a yields λG/ωm = D(a)/(1−p), where D(a)i s
deﬁned by (3.12). Solving λi/ωm from (3.1) and substituting λG yields qG = qG
2 (a). Substituting
(λG,λR) into (3.2) to obtain ρ and then substituting into (3.6), I obtain qR = qR
2 (a).
Because the two asset constraints in the goods market hold with equality in this case, dividing
the two constraints and using the fact l = 1 yields (3.13), which determines a. Rewrite the
requirement λi > 0a su0(ci) > ψ0(qi). Then, λG > 0a n dλR > 0 if and only if 0 <D (a) <µ .
Equivalently, these requirements ask a to lie in the interval [1 − zβ/γ, 1 − z(β/γ)2].
Finally, I ﬁnd the region of θ in which the solution for a lies in the above interval and show
that such a solution is unique. Note that qG
2 (a) is an increasing function and qR
2 (a) a decreasing
function. Denote the left-hand side of (3.13) temporarily as LHS(a). Then, LHS0(a) > 0. So,
if there is a solution to (3.13), then the solution is unique. For a solution to exist and to lie in
the interval speciﬁed above, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions are that LHS(1 − zβ/γ) < 0





LHS(1−z(β/γ)2) > 0i ﬀ qR
3 <Q 3(1). This condition is equivalent to θ < Θ3(1), where Θ3(1) can





So, LHS(1 − zβ/γ) < 0i ﬀ θ > Θ1,w h e r eΘ1 is deﬁned by (3.16). Therefore, Case IS exists iﬀ
Θ1 < θ < Θ3(1). QED
B. Proofs for Section 4























Here and in other parts of the proof of Proposition 4.1, the argument of f and f0 is (1+µ)/(1−
p + pθ). I will verify later that z dD
dz → 0w h e nz → 0. Using this result, diﬀerentiating (3.12)
with respect to z and evaluating the result at z =0 ,Ig e t :
da
dz






25Also, when z → 0, D → (1 − p)[p(1 − θ)+µ]/[1 − p + θp]. Diﬀerentiating (3.13) and evaluating
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< 0.







< θ < 1+
µ






< θ < 1. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.1.
To prove Proposition 4.2, note that Θ1 < θ1 for any z>0. Consider values of θ in the interval
(Θ1,Θ1 + ε), where 0 < ε < θ1 − Θ1 is small. In this interval, the equilibrium is Case IS in the
economy with the legal restriction. Substituting qG
2 and qR
2 from (3.11), I can write the steady
state utility in this economy as a function of D,s a y ,v(D). The equilibrium in the economy
without the legal restriction is Case A, where the quantities of goods traded in the two types of
matches are qG
1 and qR
1 , respectively. Let v0 denote the steady state utility in this economy, which




1 ,a n dv(D) → v0.I fv0(D) < 0,
then v(D) >v 0 for suﬃciently small ε > 0. In this case, there exists θA > Θ1 such that v>v 0
for θ ∈ (Θ1,θA), as stated in the proposition.





















Because D ≈ µ when ε is suﬃciently small, the second term on the right-hand side is close to
zero. Then v0(D) < 0 follows from the fact that f0 < 0. QED
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